What EUR 300,000 buys
when the product is already built.
Almost every pre-seed round on earth is a bet on construction. An investor hands over money so that a team can hire, build, and eventually produce a thing that today exists only as a diagram. The risk being priced is build risk: will they finish, will it work, will they still be alive when it does.
Our round is not that, and it should not be priced as if it were. Five platforms are live, and our catalogue counts 65 modules (management count, 19 August 2026); the deck marks the state of each one that is not live. 428,351 lines of code for the whole studio (census of 9 September 2026), written in 322 days, running on five servers. You can open them in a browser tonight and click through them. No new product is being built; what remains before launch is an age gate, a switch of the video provider and real test purchases on every checkout.
What is actually being funded
A management estimate of where the whole estate stands: design and architecture around 100 percent, product build 97 percent, infrastructure and operations 92 percent, content and search foundations 80 percent, distribution 20 percent, user acquisition 8 percent.
Look at that list and the shape of the problem becomes obvious. The main bottleneck is not engineering. The bottleneck is introduction: the world does not know these products exist. That is a fundamentally cheaper problem than building, and a faster one, and it is what the money is for.
Roughly 60 percent of the raise goes to distribution: switching on the five systems that are already built and checked, the content engine, the outbound reach, the syndication, the creator and user loops, plus the physical partner loop with funeral homes and stonemasons, and small paid experiments to find which channels actually convert. Roughly 30 percent is founder and team runway so that the switching-on is somebody's full-time job. Roughly 10 percent is infrastructure, legal and reserve.
Why the price is what it is
EUR 300,000 on a post-money SAFE with a valuation cap of EUR 2,000,000: 15 percent at conversion, before later rounds. One number, one instrument, no tranches and no side letters.
The reasoning behind the cap is deliberately unromantic. On our own count, rebuilding this ecosystem from zero would cost between EUR 1.0 and 2.5 million (management estimate, not a market price). The cap sits inside that range and under its upper bound. The growth curve is what comes on top; the asset values in the deck describe the software alone, with no revenue behind it.
The founder has already put in EUR 120,000 of his own money (management estimate) and 322 days of full-time work. There is no earlier investor, no cap table to untangle, no cleanup round.
What the honest risks are
Three, stated plainly, because a deck that lists none is a deck that is hiding them.
Distribution is unproven. The systems exist, but they have not yet been run at volume. Twenty percent complete on distribution means exactly what it says.
Revenue is early. The value in the estate today is a management estimate, and it is unrealized. The asset exists; the liquidity does not. Nobody pays it out until something is running.
Key person concentration. One founder built this. That is the reason it exists at all, and it is also the risk. Part of the runway is aimed directly at reducing it.
Who this suits
Family offices with patience and a taste for asymmetric European exposure. Angels who prefer founders who have already shipped over founders who intend to. Small funds who like the arithmetic of pricing an asset inside its own rebuild-cost range.
If that sounds like you, the full numbers are in the studio deck, and the founder answers his own WhatsApp and e-mail at shela@heyshela.com.